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Abstract— Ciphers, also known as authenticated encryption 
methods, are the outcome of the marriage between the fields of 
mathematics and logic. The association of ciphers and data 
comprises Cryptography, the science that assures security and 
secrecy during a discussion of two parties in the presence of a 
third one; authentication, integrity and confidentiality are the 
values of the field in which we trust. In this work, four Caesar 
Round-Two variants are developed with the register transfer-
level (RTL) abstraction, described by a hardware design 
language (HDL), simulated and implemented on Xilinx FPGAs. 
COLM, SCREAM, POET and Minalpher variants of the contest 
are all following an indistinguishable process to ensure the 
aftermath accuracy, competing each other in the meanings of 
throughput, area, and throughput-to-area (T/A) quota. Results 
are being presented and discussed over these aspects. 
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arrays; cryptography; authenticated ciphers; CAESAR; COLM; 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Authenticated ciphers assure certain qualities while 
encrypting; confidentiality, integrity and authenticity. The 
encrypting procedure combines input and the secret key under 
a way given by the protocol in use. A plaintext message and 
associated data, the number of public messages Npub and, at 
times, the number of secret messages Nsec are considered to be 
the input, whereas, the key is secret and known exclusively 
between the two parties. Once the encrypted message, known 
as ciphertext, is received by the targeted party, it has to be 
decrypted, in order to have accessible content for the recipient. 
Decrypting the ciphertext is an inverse scheme, where the 
receiver uses the key, the ciphertext and associated data, the 
numbers Npub and encrypted Nsec, if existing, to reproduce the 
initial message sent.  
But how is confidentiality, integrity and authenticity 
certified during the whole process? Confidentiality is 
profoundly assured, as the ciphertext is computed by a 
function of the initial input and the secret key. As far as the 
remaining qualities are concerned, there is a part during 
encryption, right after the transformation of the plaintext, 
where a quantity, known as Tag, is created and adhered to the 
end of the ciphertext. Tag is mainly a hash function that uses 
every detail given as input plus the key to be computed. 
Consequently, when the encrypted message is received, there 
is a quantity that corresponds to Tag, marked as Tag’; if and 
only if Tag and Tag’ are the equal, integrity and authenticity 
are proven. 
Well-known cryptography competitions as CAESAR, urge 
researchers to improvise innovative ciphers [1]. The procedure 
is divided into knock-out rounds, where candidates are asked 
to submit parts of their work, under pre-defined specifications. 
Ciphers submitted are descripted in a hardware design 
language (HDL), such as VHDL. It is usual that the early 
rounds do not require any proof for the hardware efficiency of 
the ciphers, even if its importance is well-acknowledged in 
order to prevent cases of high complexity and/or presence of 
redundant components. Based on the volume of nominees, 
examining each and every hardware implementation, that 
could likely have undesired flaws even in its logic, can be 
really time-consuming. Although, there are times that 
candidates present estimated hardware efficiency along with 
cipher description, that come out compared to their default 
characteristics [2]. 
In this work, four CAESAR contestants that have already 
made it to Round Two, have been implemented, simulated and 
examined concerning throughput, area, and throughput-to-area 
(T/A) ratio in Xilinx Virtex FPGAs [1]. The dominant factor 
to specifically choose SCREAM, POET, Minalpher and 
COLM over the total of Round-Two ciphers is the 
cryptographic primitive ‘Tweakable Block Cipher’, in which 
first three are based and the similar structure of the fourth one; 
fact that allows a fertile ground to conduct any kind of 
comparison [3]. Under obligation towards trustworthy 
observations, hardware implementation is also developed in 
the universal hardware CAESAR Application Programming 
Interface (API) for authentication based on symmetric 
encryption algorithms [4]. 
II. CAESAR COMPETITION 
Back to 1997, the United States National Institute of 
Standards and Technology (NIST) conducted a competition 
for a new Advanced Encryption Standard (AES); in 2004, 
ENCRYPT targeted in finding a new stream cipher suitable 
for widespread adoption, while, in 2007 another competition 
was looking for a new hash standard to agree on. As tradition 
holds, in 2013, CAESAR competition was announced [1]. 
CAESAR (Competition for Authenticated Encryption: 
Security, Applicability, and Robustness) is aiming to the 
invention of authenticated symmetric-encryption algorithms. 
Contestants design and develop ciphers that satisfy certain 
pre-settled directions. CAESAR is structured into three knock-
out rounds, followed by the phase of the finalists. The 
procedure is planned to last approximately four years; 
commencing with the first Round in January 2013 until May 
2014, participants submit a kind of premature version of their 
cipher, which is describing the cipher software-wise. Once 
successful to Round Two submissions are announced, in July 
2015, their researchers are allowed to import any applicable 
tweaks and, simultaneously, are asked to attach a description 
for the hardware layout of their cipher. By the time being 
(June 2016), it is known that COLM, SCREAM, POET and 
Minalpher, are successfully selected to proceed to Round 
Two. In August 2016, announcement for Third Round 
candidates will take place; chosen participants will enter the 
phase of the finalists. CAESAR winner will be publicly 
disclosed, on 15th December 2017. 
III. ANALYSIS OF THE COMPARATIVE BASIS 
Principal purpose of this work, is to focus on comparing 
and contrasting the efficiency of four authenticated ciphers, 
under the same conditions of simulation and implementation. 
For this cause, all ciphers –updated to any applicable Round 
Two tweaks- will once be developed according to published 
standardizations and a universal, fertile for comparison, 
interface. The CAESAR Hardware API is specially designed 
for the situation by George Mason University (GMU) [5]. 
What CAESAR API basically is an input/output interface 
(I/O) that allows flexible reception, segmentation and 
formatting of the data processing. In case of Serial 
Input/Parallel Output (SIPO) or Parallel Input/Serial Output 
(PISO), not only they are supported by the API, but it is also 
proved to require less interconnections; considering that, the 
span of applications implemented on FPGAs can significantly 
augment. 
Hardware API favors candidates, given that is offering 
some extra features that are applied universally [6]. During the 
implementations, all ciphers used the padding technique; when 
incomplete blocks of associated data exist, then ‘1’ followed 
by the needful total of ‘0’s is appended to the block. Though, 
there is a chance for an undesired drawback to occur; the 
upper process might cause the creation of an extra block anew. 
Truncation of the final block is also a service that happens 
frequently enough; when truncation length is known after 
synthesis time, the procedure could turn out extremely pricey. 
CAESAR Hardware API cater for all upper services 
automatically, resulting simultaneously in great financial 
savings. Candidates need to put their encryption/decryption 
main unit into cipher core datapath and cipher core cotroller, 
so as to be in position of using the CAESAR API. A 
meaningful remark can be made at this point, regarding the 
design of the controller and the signal management, which is 
flexible and efficient in encrypting as much as in decrypting, 
too.  
Before the universal implementation of the CAESAR API, 
candidates used their own, custom-made interfaces, which of 
course did not meet any common requirements among three 
ciphers. Top-level interfaces are mentioned in detail in [7], 
[8], [9] and [10] for COLM, SCREAM, POET and Minalpher 
respectively. 
IV. EXAMINATION OF THE AUTHENTICATED CIPHERS  
In this Section, main aspects of the chosen CAESAR 
ciphers will be presented. Comprehending the basic 
procedures of encryption and decryption, as depicted in Figure 
1, proves to be much advantageous for the target of this work. 
Firstly, COLM will be examined, followed by SCREAM, 
POET, and then Minalpher. 
 
Fig. 1. Generic System Architecture 
COLM cipher is actually formulated as a mixture of 
characteristics adopted from COPA and ELmD ciphers [7]. 
COLM family is parameterized according to value τ, known as 
the enumeration of blocks after which intermediate tags will 
be created; for instance, COLM0 has no intermediate tags 
whereas COLM127 does. Encryption key K, associated data, 
original message, Npub and a set of parameters are combined 
under specified ways to generate ciphertext C and contingent 
intermediate tags T, which will be used during decryption to 
retrieve original message M. Once retrieval is complete, tag 
verification is held, to validate authenticity. 
SCREAM (Side-Channel Resistant Authenticated 
Encryption with Masking) is an authenticated cipher, which 
was also successfully selected as a Round Two candidate. Its 
logic is based on the idea of Tweakable Authenticated 
Encryption (TAE) by Liskov et al [3]. What is basically 
happening during encryption is a repeatedly procedure for 
each step, commencing with calculating a tweak key TKi; TKi 
is an operation among the secret key, a nonce and the counter 
i, which indexes the number of the block. After TKi is known, 
the 128-bit status word passes through a Substitution Box (S-
Box), and in the way out a round constant RC (ρ, σ) is added 
to its value. RC is a variable of round number ρ є {0,1} and 
step number σ є {0...NS-1}. The amount that results from the 
addition goes through a permutation (L-Box). Round Two 
version of SCREAM cipher includes a lightly updated S-Box, 
which allows better performance during differential 
calculations and is decreasing algebraic degree. Furthermore, 
throughput-to-area (T/A) ratio is improved when S-Box and 
L-Box are apart, so this is also the approach that is examined 
[11]. 
POET encryption cipher (Pipelineable On-line Encryption 
with authentication Tag) is an independent, authenticated 
cipher that allows user to select any hash function or cipher 
block as long as they fulfil expectations of [12]. Round Two 
version is importantly improved; the amount of subkeys 
required for encryption is lessened to 3, from the initial total 
of 5, while, simultaneously, the final header block can be 
calculated with 3 to 5 times fewer multiplications. Subkeys K 
and L are computed as a function of key via AES-main; K is 
used for all operations, while L is used to mask the blocks of 
associated data. In the latest version of POET, designers used 
two distinguished subkeys for AES-Top and AES-Bottom, 
which are now merged as one shared subkey Kf, an action 
ending up in great area savings. As long as all subkeys are 
computed, a portion known as hash value is encrypted and is 
now called authentication value τ. Registers AES-top and 
AES-bottom are initialized and the procedure continues as 
described in [12]. The authenticated cipher uses a verification 
tag, which is created from a part of the encrypted final block. 
This is one of the most expensive steps of the whole 
procedure, as it demands the existence of variable shifters and 
several truncations.  
Minalpher, the third chosen authenticated cipher of this 
work, is specifically a cryptographic core, also known as a 
Tweakable Even-Mansour (TEM). Four alterations can happen 
in a TEM while encrypting or decrypting [13]. For each time 
there is a call towards TEM, a new tweak is being computed. 
While combining the secret key K, a flag and a nonce, tweak 
is figured out as a function of three other portions; the initial 
tweak value L, the root y of a composite Galois Field 
polynomial, and the variable exponents i and j that increase by 
0,1 or 2 with each block. As L is the initial tweak that depends 
on K, flag and Npub it needs to update right before every TEM 
round. A slight point where Minalpher differs from the other 
two ciphers is that it uses the 10* padding technique not only 
in associated data but also in plaintext processing. In the case 
that the last plaintext occurs to be a full block, the number of 
blocks will expand to one more, as 10* padding has to take 
place under obligation.  Encrypting procedure begins with the 
processing of first plaintext, which turns into the first 
ciphertext through a TEM, and consequently the latest passes 
through another TEM, whose exit is finally added to the 
current hash. Once all plaintexts have turned into ciphertexts, 
the latest hash added to the conclusive plaintext block 
contribute to the calculation of the tag. During decrypting two 
cores are being used, as in encrypting too, but in this case tag 
can be computed at the same time with the decryption of the 
final ciphertext. Unfortunately, the size of the primitive 
plaintext can only have been known after decryption is 
complete, as the 10* padding has applied. In this 
implementation, examines ciphertext inch by inch to discover 
the specific point where 10* padding commenced; this will 
also be the length of the ciphertext. 
V. DESIGN, COMPARISON AND RESULTS 
Implementations of the four examined authenticated 
ciphers, were described in VHDL hardware description 
language. Formulating an unbiased base for all comparisons 
and remarks, demands one common testing field and careful 
examination under predetermined conditions; for this cause, 
CAESAR Hardware API, and Xilinx Vivado Design Suite, 
were used. Measurements and results of the above applications 
were all checked regarding validity and proper functionality 
via Xilinx tools. All input plaintexts and key vectors are by 
default the size of 128-bit, unless indicated otherwise. 
 COLM  SCREAM POET  MINALPHER   
TCLK (ns) 9,2592  8,9816 4,2655  4,4064   
fCLK  (MHz) 108  118,141 211,565  236,232   
Slices 2633  859 2003  1640   
LUTs 6878  2993 7401  6073   
Registers 4200  1591 3631  4045   
Throughput 
(Mbps) 
1257 1374 2708  3182   
Throughput 
to Area 
(T/A) 
0,477 0,459 0,366  0,524   
Table 1. FPGA Implemenations Synthesis Results 
Table 1 presents in detail interesting aspects of CAESAR 
ciphers that relate directly with their effectiveness. According 
to the axis of T/A ratio of authenticated ciphers in an FPGA 
Virtex device, values –calculated as the quotient of throughput 
to slices- for COLM, SCREAM, POET and Minalpher ciphers 
are depicted in Figure 3. Profoundly, Minalpher is the 
authenticated cipher with the greatest T/A ratio at 0,524; 
COLM, SCREAM and POET are following consequently, at 
0,477, 0,459 and 0,366 accordingly. 
 
Fig. 3. Statistics of Throughput to Area ratio 
Another outstanding, deriving from the comparative table, 
fact is that SCREAM manages less than the half of the 
throughput of each other remaining ciphers except COLM. 
Remarks concerning area, specified in terms of LUTs, can be 
extracted; SCREAM is the cipher with the fewest LUTs. 
Namely, its total of LUTs is only 40, 43 and 49 percentages of 
the total of POET, COLM and Minalpher respectively. 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
VI. JUXTAPOSITION WITH AES, IDEA, DES AND RC5 
There is an interesting perspective of putting CAESAR 
selected ciphers aside to other symmetric encryption 
algorithms. In [14], [15] and [16] four well known and widely 
used ciphers, are being analyzed and implemented on various 
FPGA devices; measurements are collected and analyzed for 
AES (both AKE and ARKL architetcures), IDEA, DES and 
RC5 (Carry Look Ahead design). All ciphers were 
functionally examined to ensure a flawless process for 
encryption and decryption.  
 AES 
(AKE) 
AES 
(ARKL) 
IDEA DES RC5 
TCLK (ns) 45,45 35,09 20 11,77 23,81 
fCLK  (MHz) 22 28,5 50 85 42 
CLB Slices 2358 17314 1852 341 437 
Throughput 
(Mbps) 
259 3650 711 245 5376 
Throughput 
to Area (T/A) 
0,110 0,211 0,384 0,718 1,23 
Table 2. Implementation Synthesis Results Comparisons 
As depicted in Table 2, AES with feedback logic (AKE) can 
reach a throughput up to 259 Mbps whereas AES with 
pipelining technique (ARKL) can significantly achieve 
throughput up to 3,65 Gbps. As far as IDEA and DES are 
concerned, they can range up to 711 and 245 Mbps 
respectively. Based on the extremelly high throughput 
measurments and its relatively good frequency, RC5 manages 
to achieve the best performance among all ciphers mentioned. 
 
Fig. 4. Throughput to Area for other ciphers 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND OUTLOOK 
In this work, we examined four authenticated ciphers of 
CAEASAR competition, that passed successfully to Round 
Two. Candidates were urged to submit their encryption 
algorithms updated with any applicable tweaks for Round 
Two, all described in a hardware description language (HDL). 
The implementation was developed using RTL design on a 
shared application interface, particularly designed for the 
purpose of the competition, known as CAESAR Hardware 
API for symmetric encryption algorithms. Once 
implementation was complete, in order to verify the gathered 
measurements, Xilinx tools were used. Comparison of ciphers 
and results were assembled for a Xilinx Virtex FPGA device.  
Although using one of the highest rates of LUTs, 
Minalpher had the greatest Throughput -to-Area (T/A) rate in 
the Virtex FPGA; SCREAM, POET and COLM were 
following respectively. Finally, a comparison of CAESAR 
contestants and other ciphers was attempted in Section V. 
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